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Abstract 
This chapter develops a republican perspective on the possibility and potential of developing 
stronger forms of global political responsibility by focusing upon the role of citizens and the 
function of the state. This republican perspective argues that responsiveness is a crucial element 
of political responsibility and contends that republicanism’s focus upon the activity and 
dispositions of citizens as political actors, which can animate political responsiveness in both 
national and global governance, can position the state as being an agent for promoting liberty at 
home and abroad. However, it argues that republicanism needs to adapt to the contemporary 
political context and consequently further develops a position termed ‘critical republicanism’ by 
Cécile Laborde, which draws from critical theory’s interest in social change to develop an 
account of republican responsibility and responsiveness adapted to globalization. 
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15. Republican Citizens and Political Responsibility in a 
Globalizing World 
Steven Slaughter 
It is increasingly common for scholars working within political and democratic theory to 
assert that states ought to have global responsibilities. However, less attention is paid to 
the political conditions required to cultivate global responsibility and ensure that these 
responsibilities are supported by the power of states and effective forms of global 
governance. Consequently, this chapter articulates a republican perspective which 
contends that responsiveness is a crucial element of political responsibility. It argues that 
the development of global responsibilities for states requires citizens who feel responsible 
for their state and a state that is responsible and responsive to its citizenry. The 
contribution that republicanism can make to debates regarding the feasibility of global 
responsibilities is its focus upon the activity and dispositions of citizens as political 
actors, which can animate political responsiveness in both national and global 
governance., This positions the state as an agent for promoting liberty at home and 
abroad. While republicanism has an avowed focus on the citizen and the state to develop 
forms of collective power, this chapter contends that current practices of citizenship and 
the state are not sufficient, or automatically a basis, for global forms of responsibility. 
Consequently, while this chapter contends that citizens and states are essential to the 
development of political responsibility, it argues that republicanism needs to adapt to the 
contemporary political context and consequently further develops a position termed 
‘critical republicanism’ by Cécile Laborde (2010) which draws from critical theory’s 
interest in social change to develop a more dynamic account of republican responsibility 
and responsiveness adapted to globalization. This chapter first explores the nature and 
problems of cosmopolitan accounts of global responsibility, then examines how 
republican political responsibility operates through the state, and finally outlines how 
republicanism is able to develop political responsibility and responsiveness in national 
and global contexts. 
Political responsibility and globalization 
The concept of responsibility is a crucial part of individual and collective responses to 
problems and harms. The concept of responsibility orientates the relationship of both 
individuals and collectives to particular problems and specifies which agents ought to act 
to address these problems. Such language is present in political debates and in political 
theorizing, and is normally divided in terms of moral and political responsibility 
(Beardsworth 2015). This chapter takes the view that these two forms of responsibility 
are interlaced and that the division is not an issue of the strength of the responsibility 
(with political responsibility being a higher standard), rather it is essentially about a 
difference between asking questions about moral judgement and questions about political 
processes. Moral responsibility denotes a focus on the agents or institutions which are 
culpable or to blame for injustice or have an obligation to address injustice, whereas 
political responsibility is more about the practical questions regarding the accountability 
processes of official decision-making. Political responsibility is more than a moral 
judgement of what the agents and institutions involved ought to do, and has more of a 
focus on how procedures and practices enable moral responsibility to be enacted. In 
broad terms moral responsibility is a question of which agents have responsibility for a 
given state of affairs, and political responsibility is a question of which processes enact 
this responsibility. 
Nevertheless, responsibility in both moral and political terms is not always easy to determine 
or establish. Obviously, there are occasions where certain agents clearly breach established moral 
behaviour and are held responsible for their actions in producing injustice or where official 
decision-making processes have not been effective in producing just outcomes. However, as Iris 
Marion Young clearly outlines, it is often the case that injustice associated with conditions like 
poverty is the product of structural features where responsibility and liability are socially 
distributed and not clearly held by any one agent (Young 2011, ch. 4). While she claims that 
responsibility in her ‘social connection model’ can come from being involved and contributing to 
social processes that produce unjust outcomes that are unintended and do not deviate from 
established moral standards (Young 2011, 104–5), this does not mean that such responsibility is 
easy to realize in political terms. Such difficulties have been amplified by the development of 
contemporary forms of globalization, which have extended moral responsibilities following from 
global economic interconnections (Young 2011, 136; Beardsworth 2015). In addition to 
expanding the range of moral responsibility, globalization has also further developed pressing 
transnational problems that no state can address on its own. Furthermore, moral and political 
responsibility is also difficult to establish because innovations in technology have enabled social 
connections and environmental problems to persist across time and space. Indeed, the central 
political problem of the era of globalization is the expanding awareness of moral responsibility 
without clear progress on developing binding forms of political responsibility. 
However, despite the absence of strongly binding political responsibilities, states have 
attempted, over time, to develop means to enable co-existence and cooperate to enable mutual 
gains and address common problems. In recent decades we have referred to such cooperation as 
global governance. Contemporary global governance refers to international and transnational 
rule-setting mechanisms, which includes public and private forms of activity that encompass 
formal International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) set up by states, private forms of 
regulation established by business, the networking of transnational civil society as well as hybrid 
forms of governance that blur these forms of rule-setting and transnational policy networks, 
including private and public actors (Hale and Held 2011). However, despite the development of 
elaborate forms of global governance set up by states and societal agents, there are still questions 
of whether these forms of governance can adequately articulate or support existing forms of 
moral responsibility or be guided by strong accounts of political responsibility. While global 
governance can be effective with respect to some issues, its capacity to develop clear forms of 
political responsibility are undermined by: the variable interest and support of nation-states 
(especially powerful ones); the ways that global governance generally prioritizes the ideas and 
interests of powerful business groups—rather than the broader views of civil society or the 
public; and the democratic deficits in global governance which make it opaque and unresponsive 
to the societies it affects. All of these points support the claim that global political responsibility 
is possible and feasible, but political change is required to make such a possibility a consistent 
feature of global politics. 
In recent decades, cosmopolitan scholarship has been at the forefront of efforts to change the 
boundaries of moral responsibility and restructure global governance with the aim of making 
political responsibility operate to address global problems in a more effective manner. 
Cosmopolitanism argues for a moral responsibility to the universal community of humanity rather 
than specific nations. Cosmopolitan positions supporting this global responsibility range from 
support for the human rights of all people, to the creation of a global democratic system that is 
bound by laws determined by people rather than states. Such a democratic system has been 
termed ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ by David Held (1995). While such a position advocates a 
universal system of democracy that includes the eventual development of many of the elements of 
global government on the foundations of existing IGOs, this development would rest on a global 
constitutional order entrenched in ‘democratic public law’, which develops laws that influence 
every actor and level of existing governance (Held 1995, 143–218). It is important to note that 
this proposal is not just animated by a concern to address the problems of the vulnerable people 
around the world but also reflects the observations that various processes of globalization have 
radically delimited the capacity of the democratic nation-states to have any real control over their 
futures (Held 1995, chs. 5 and 6). As such, the cosmopolitan project assumes that the needs of all 
human beings requires extending global moral responsibility to include them, and that political 
responsibility can no longer be limited to any one nation-state. In short: the cosmopolitan position 
here is that global responsibility requires global political structures (see Chapter 11, this volume). 
However, this cosmopolitan conception of democracy has been widely challenged on the 
grounds of feasibility. Some scholars have noted that the development of this form of global 
democracy is a political programme that is either unlikely to be realized or is unnecessary in the 
sense that a deliberative conception of democracy, which rests upon improving transnational 
deliberations, could be more feasible in developing global moral responsibilities with respect to 
global governance (Dryzek 2006). Furthermore, there is also the important question of who is 
going to advance cosmopolitanism in practice? As Heikki Patomäki (2003, 357) claimed: ‘Held is 
concerned with detailed prescriptions about how global governance should be organized but has 
very little to say about who could (or would like to) realize his vision, under what circumstances, 
and with what consequences’. While cosmopolitans are quick to point to the existence of human 
rights and the activity of transnational civil society, there are questions about the strength of these 
practices. Underlying this concern is a sense that cosmopolitanism is based on a ‘thin’ conception 
of morality rather than the ‘thick’ and well-established sense of moral responsibility that stems 
from the lived and historically developed forms of community and democratic political process 
evident in the nation-state (Young 2013, 138. See Walzer 1994). 
This leads to claims that cosmopolitans do not fully appreciate the enduring significance and 
power of the nation-state. While the state is an institution that has existed in a wide variety of 
forms over history, it remains a focal point of existing forms of governance and political identity. 
Central to the modern state has been the principle and practice of sovereignty manifest in 
centralized authority over a delimited territory backed by a monopoly over the legitimate use of 
force, the possession of the legitimate right of taxation, the capacity to create domestic law and 
enter into international legal arrangements, as well as playing a key role in shaping its 
population’s identity (Linklater 1998a, 118–20). Nationalism refers to a political and cultural 
identification of the people of a particular nation with that nation-state, where the loyalty of a 
person to other members of their specific nation generally overrides obligations to all other 
communities. Nationalism is clearly more deeply ingrained and more instantiated than 
cosmopolitan calls for global moral responsibilities. Anne Marie Slaughter and Thomas Hale 
(2005, 2) claim that if we ‘define the challenges of global governance as a struggle between 
progressive, cosmopolitan forces and conservative, nationalist ones, then cosmopolitanism will 
lose’. The agency and power of the state remain crucial to the realization of normative projects in 
domestic and global politics. This leads to calls for ‘cosmopolitan states’ (Brown 2011) or 
‘cosmopolitan constitutions’ to place restraints on the ways states affect people outside that state 
(Shapcott 2013). However, calls to develop cosmopolitan practices within states are also open to 
Patomäki’s critique of who is going to act to enable this and how it is going to occur. It also leads 
to the question of what motivations are required for citizens within the state to be the instigators 
of such projects. 
This criticism of cosmopolitan efforts to promote global responsibility leads us to question 
whether global responsibility can be created in a ‘bottom up’ fashion driven by the dispositions 
and activity of citizens living in states. This leads us to the republican position’s defence of civic 
life as being a lived practice within a state, which aspires to prevent domination. The question is 
whether republican citizens can enable and direct the state to place restraints on the ways it 
affects people outside the state, and develop global responsibilities that extend the republican 
concern to minimize domination. So the consideration here is whether republican arguments 
could avoid the problems facing the thinness of cosmopolitan political community but still be 
able to develop political practices able to develop forms of responsibility beyond the state. While 
republicanism is a key position for developing the institutions and culture needed for political 
responsibility to be possible, the question is how can republicanism enable political responsibility 
to operate beyond the state to address pressing global forms of domination? 
Republicanism, the state and political responsibility 
Republicanism is a long-standing tradition of political thought that has been revived in 
recent decades in the form of neo-roman republicanism. The neo-roman account focuses 
upon the development of a civic form of individual liberty and is often distinguished from 
communitarian accounts which focus upon the intrinsic benefits of political participation 
within a given community (Dagger 2006, 153; Pettit 1999a; Skinner 1998). 
Republicanism develops the position that liberty depends upon citizens having a 
responsibility for the activities of government that are enshrined in the political 
institutions and culture of political life. The central contemporary articulators of the neo-
roman republican tradition, such as Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner, claim that this way 
of thinking about civic liberty and good government gained coherence in the Italian 
Renaissance and later in the revolutions in England, France, and America. These scholars 
have placed republican ideas closer to a liberal conception of individual liberty but in 
contrast to liberalism, claim that this liberty can only be collectively constituted by the 
laws and institutions of an appropriately empowered republican state that directly 
addresses various forms of domination. This concern for domination and servility leads 
republican scholars to focus upon the overarching goal of developing a robust form of 
individual liberty conceived as ‘non-domination’: an institutionalized context where 
citizens are free from the arbitrary interference or subordination by the state itself or from 
other interests or actors in society (Pettit 1999a, 80). 
This conception of non-domination is a political creation that is realized by three 
interconnected elements of republican practice. The first element is the development of a 
constitutional state which exerts power to constitute individual independence through publicly 
developed laws and policies that focus upon protecting individuals and dampening down the 
flows of power that adversely affect them and also encompass publicly developed efforts to 
augment the capacity of individuals to protect themselves from subjection (Pettit 1999a, ch. 5). 
The republican idea of the state is not a minimal state but a state empowered to promote the 
public good while also ensuring that the capacities of the state are checked and balanced as well 
as distributed federally. The second element is the practice of democracy where a republican state 
is managed by procedural checks and balances as well as democratic processes of responsiveness, 
which encompass both electoral and plebiscitary procedures (Pettit 1999b). Democracy plays a 
crucial process in enabling a robust conception of political responsibility of citizens to direct the 
power of the state while also promoting a strong sense of political responsibility and 
accountability of the state to the citizenry. The third element is an active conception of 
citizenship, which is manifest in an enduring culture of civic virtue and patriotism. Such a 
conception of citizenship encompasses involvement in political life, political responsibility for the 
state, and public deliberation as to the nature of the public good (Miller 1999, 65). This is 
understood as a historically developed love and sense of citizen responsibility for the norms and 
institutions that make liberty possible in a particular state, and a form of equality and reciprocity 
between republican citizens (Dagger 2006, 156; Viroli 1995, 2). 
Consequently republicanism couches its account of responsibility primarily in political 
terms, and this account of political responsibility rests on developing the lived practices of active 
citizenship and patriotism that democratically direct the state. Republican responsibilities stem 
from the cultural dynamic of practised solidarity, evident in the republican ideals of ‘liberty, 
equality, community’ (Pettit 1999a, ch. 4). Republicans are keen to indicate that solidarity and 
community membership are an important part of lived practices of responsibility and reciprocity, 
rather than responsibilities being primarily of an abstract legal or philosophical quality. These 
forms of solidarity are a ‘thick’ sense of moral responsibility rather than a ‘thin’ account (Walzer 
1994). In a more specific sense, republicans are keen to place emphasis on the political nature of 
patriotism and citizenship rather than nationalism. According to Maurizio Viroli (1995, 13), 
patriotism is primarily motivated by the desire to live in a country characterized by liberty, and is 
‘sustained by shared memories of [a] commitment to liberty, social criticism, and resistance 
against oppression and corruption’ rather than by cultural homogeneity or ethnic nationalistic 
commitments. In short, while nationalism may be a ‘partial replacement’ for patriotism (Miller 
1999, 67), it is not sufficient for the active conception of citizenship required for republicanism to 
direct and control a republican state. While this sense of responsibility is enshrined in patriotism 
and the civic virtues of the republican political community, it is backed by a clear sense of a 
collective self-interest in controlling the state and enabling liberty within that context. This 
contrasts with cosmopolitanism because republicanism sees ‘freedom as a particular and 
contingent achievement’ that depends upon the political responsibilities between citizens and the 
state, which rely on specific forms of trust and reciprocity, and at ‘the global level, it is not 
possible to reproduce the practices, institutions and virtue essential to founding and maintaining 
republics’ (Laborde 2010, 49. See Pettit 2014, 157–9). 
Therefore, the republican account of citizenship and patriotism entails a specific political 
responsibility for a state, which constitutes and constrains the power of that state. This account 
can be distilled from the imperfect operation of citizens of contemporary democratic nation-states 
but also seeks to develop an empowered state that differs markedly from liberal accounts of the 
state. This view of an active and empowered state that intervenes in society to promote the public 
good and common liberty contrasts with the liberal view that states necessarily are neutral or 
minimal frameworks for political action (Pettit 1999a, 112). For instance, Iris Marion Young 
(2013, 151) makes the claim that states are effectively an arena rather than an agent for struggles 
against injustice by claiming that states tend to ‘reflect the outcomes of those struggles than to 
balance between them or adjudicate them’. However, republicanism sees the practices noted 
above as clearly orientating the political field towards the cause of non-domination because 
citizens give the state a stronger sense of agency to identify and address public concerns. It is the 
case that citizens may operate within civil society activity outside the state, as Young indicates, 
but the key features of republicanism are that the political institutions of the state and the political 
culture of virtuous citizenship ensure that the pursuit of liberty is a concrete and political one 
borne out of a historical sense of community and collective responsibility for each other’s liberty. 
Because this collective responsibility operates in a democratic context, a key feature of this 
relationship is one where governments are responsive to public inputs both through civil society 
but also through the democratic, judicial, and administrative avenues of the state (Pettit 1999a, 
195–6). 
Responsiveness is a crucial element with regards to how moral and political responsibility 
can operate to promote justice and non-domination. Rather than only focusing upon the idea of 
obligation and ‘forward-looking’ moral responsibility, or accountability and ‘backwards-looking’ 
moral responsibility (Erskine 2008, 701), there is also the important element of being responsive 
during political practice. The idea of the ‘responsive republic’ is one that stresses the immediacy 
of political responsibility and the importance of providing both institutional processes of public 
deliberation and formal processes by which citizens can influence public affairs by directing and 
checking the power of the state (Pettit 1999a, 195–6; Pettit 2014 ch. 5). Crucial here is the notion 
that citizens deliberate the nature of the public good in order to influence the power of the state 
and that the state publicly gives reasons for political action. It is important to indicate that these 
responsibilities are not primarily of a legal nature but operate at the level of democratic checks 
and balances, which include plebiscitary democratic opportunities (Pettit 1999b). Responsiveness 
is crucial to enable citizens to have the actual freedom and capacity to support their moral 
responsibilities at home and abroad, as well as ensuring that political responsibility is not just a 
post hoc or punitive sense of accountability for agents of the state but a constant and immediate 
pressure for political decision-making to act in the interests of the public. Republican scholarship 
sees this responsive conception of the republican state as the basis of meaningful political 
responsibilities able to uphold the public good of a given society and thus promote non-
domination within a specific context. In this sense, republican responsibilities stem from political 
institutions and a culture of responsiveness and democracy that direct an active and empowered 
state, not from a culture of chauvinistic nationalism or abstract legalism or rights. Therefore, there 
is the possibility that this sense of responsibility and responsiveness could be extended beyond 
the state in various ways. 
There are four main ways republicanism develops or facilitates responsibilities beyond the 
state. The first way the state could extend responsibilities beyond the state is by republican 
citizens ensuring that their states are ‘good international citizens’ in terms of foreign policy that 
addresses external problems to enable domestic responsiveness and addresses the vulnerability 
and domination of people in other societies (Pettit 2014, 185–7). This sense of international 
responsibility has been associated with various theories of International Relations, especially 
liberal internationalism (Shapcott 2013, 140–4), and is generally understood to include a respect 
for international law, a willingness to support international security and human rights, and 
prevent environmental problems. The republican values noted mean that citizens ought to direct 
their state to be active with respect to these issues and that ‘civically minded citizens will be 
motivated to make sure that they—or their state—do not dominate others; that they are not 
dominated by others; and that others are not dominated by others’ (Laborde 2010, 51). While 
republicanism defends a particularistic account of political community animated by civic and 
patriotic values, and considers that neither a world state nor an ascriptive global public exists, 
republicans contend that various publics around the world could still direct their respective states 
to use their foreign policy to collaboratively develop global forms of international law that further 
the cause of non-domination by restricting the power of private market actors and states by 
ensuring that states have clear political responsibilities to each other (Pettit 2010, 79–86). Pettit 
(2014, 153) couches this legal activity in terms of an ideal republican framework of ‘globalized 
sovereignty’, which places constitutional restraints on how states deal with other states and 
supports the sovereignty of all societies—republican or not. 
A second way responsibilities extend beyond the state is an especially important form of 
republican foreign policy evident in efforts to encourage and develop states that are republican, or 
at least representative. Because republicans contend that non-domination can only be reliably 
ensured by the power of a republican state, the moral responsibility to address domination 
elsewhere requires the development of foreign policy by republican states, which helps other 
societies to develop their own locally responsive forms of republican state practice. Michael 
Barnett (2006, 90) criticizes contemporary liberal post-conflict reconstruction efforts as being that 
of ‘shock therapy’ and claims that ‘republicanism’s emphasis on deliberative processes allows 
space for societal actors to determine for themselves what the good life is and how to achieve it’. 
Barnett characterizes republicanism as a pragmatic approach to politics, which seeks to develop 
local political institutions that promote deliberation and representation, and which emphasizes the 
threats of factions in society and imposes constitutional restraints on authority. Such an approach 
proposes that ‘creating bridges between factions and individuals as they build a community might 
also produce a greater love of country and a sense of patriotism, understood as a sense of 
belonging that transcends race, ethnicity, or other groupings’ (Barnett 2006, 90). While such 
activity may be driven by the needs of republican states to stabilize regional or global security, 
the moral responsibility of creating local political agency that promotes the needs of society needs 
to be sensitive about power relations and avoid ‘clientelizing the recipient country’ (Pettit 2014, 
186). 
A third way responsibilities could extend beyond the state according to republicanism is via 
the responsibility to develop international institutions. This support for international governance 
and IGOs is an external reflection of the internal republican focus on institutions and the rule of 
law reflecting an intent to avoid either a world government or international anarchy by creating a 
framework of globalized sovereignty (Pettit 2010, 2014). The responsibility to develop IGOs is 
driven by the need to enable effective sovereignty in a context of globalization and promote the 
civic condition of non-domination domestically by promoting international stability and 
dampening specific forms of interstate and transnational domination. This activity also requires 
developing the means to ensure that citizens can be certain that IGOs are responsive and therefore 
non-arbitrary, to assist in reducing domination elsewhere wherever possible, and also to act as 
another check on the power of republican states. Indeed, Richard Beardsworth (2015, 78–9) 
indicates that delegating sovereignty to protect its population from transnational threats is a key 
political responsibility that a state has to its population. In effect, these international forms of 
governance and institutionalism entail the development of political responsibilities between 
republican states that are required for republicanism to address international and transnational 
forms of domination. Put another way, while republicans have focused on the ways that citizens 
could empower and check the power of the state, in effect the power of the state, in recent times, 
has been transferred to global forms of governance. The contemporary state is not the monolithic 
state of the past, but rather a ‘disaggregated’ state that has delegated many of its key functions to 
regional and global governance (A. Slaughter 2004). 
So it follows that, if the power and capacity of the state has been extended in many areas of 
policymaking, then the concern and political responsibility of citizens also needs to be extended. 
Republicanism contends that this requires developing institutional processes whereby citizens can 
deliberate and contest the decision-making in international institutions and use these bodies as 
another check and balance to ensure responsiveness. Pettit (1999b, 296) refers to this need to 
develop formal political responsibilities beyond the state as a form of ‘contestatory democracy’ 
where citizens have both ‘authorial’ and ‘editorial’ powers in relation to government. Authorial 
powers involves the public selecting representatives while editorial powers includes measures 
that keep the actions of government transparent and accountable in order to promote common 
interests. Such oversight would include expected procedures such as freedom of information 
provisions, a range of consultative measures that include petitions and public committees, and an 
ability to appeal and reshape law via an independent auditor, judicial and administrative review, 
and most importantly, direct democratic plebiscites. The advantage of contestatory democracy is 
that it ensures that IGOs are responsive to the publics of member states and also places 
transnational checks on electoral politics because citizens could appeal to international 
institutions when states fail to uphold their internationally declared obligations and sanction 
arbitrary government decision-making (Pettit 2006, 314–20). Democracy would, in essence, have 
‘extra checks provided by having international as well as national sites of contestation’ and this 
would ensure that citizens have reactive and proactive avenues to consider and contest public 
decisions and conduct their political responsibilities (Pettit 2006, 321). 
A fourth way the republican approach can be seen to facilitate responsibilities beyond the 
state is via the cultivation of citizens who engage with the activity of transnational civil society. 
While republican citizens are required to initiate and guide the preceding forms of state 
responsibility, they can also be involved in transnational civil society activity to provide 
alternative means of enacting the accountability and monitoring of states, business actors, and 
IGOs (Dryzek 2011, 2012). This is consistent with the republican view that the way that states 
enable a free and vibrant domestic civil society, public sphere, and media system is crucial to 
enabling a political context able to promote an energetic and responsive civic life (Pettit 1999a, 
166–9). There is a sense that transnational civil society ‘begins at home’ by the way the 
republican state provides liberty to its citizens and permits and nurtures public deliberation. 
Furthermore, in the context of global governance it is the case that it is sometimes hard to 
disentangle official rule-setting from the activity of transnational civil society. Republicans see 
global governance as being both encouraging and problematic with regards to the realization of 
non-domination because it encompasses both official IGOs set up by states and unofficial forms 
of governance and influence set up by individuals or private groups which can be opaque. While 
republicans place more confidence in the capacity of IGOs than other forms of global governance 
(Buckinx 2012; Pettit 2006), citizens acting within civil society are present and provide key ways 
of making global governance more transparent and responsive. Republicanism can be seen to 
encourage this transnational deliberation, as imperfect as it is, by encouraging the existence of 
politically active citizens wanting to ensure that political life is transparent, that their states are 
being publicly responsive and not being overpowered by private interests. In this sense, the 
patriotism that animates the republican state is not ‘exclusive’ or a hindrance to international 
moral responsibilities or solidarity (Viroli 1995, 12). Indeed, it provides the context for citizens to 
be more politically attuned to whether their state is acting at home or abroad to provide liberty 
and whether support can be given to other society’s efforts to promote their own liberty. 
Realizing republican global responsibilities 
We can see here that republicanism offers ‘bottom-up’ avenues whereby republican states 
can incubate various forms of political responsibility and responsiveness to be extended 
beyond the state. Such forms of responsibility require citizens that have the disposition to 
recognize and respond to the needs of dominated people outside their state. Such a 
disposition is evident in a generalized concern on the part of republican citizens to 
minimize domination wherever it occurs (Laborde 2010, 51–2) and to be especially 
concerned about checking the actions of their state and ensuring that global forms of 
governance are responsive. However, there are key challenges facing the realization of 
republican politics. The central practical challenge is that it is clear that these republican 
dispositions are not inherent in current political reality and therefore need to be 
encouraged and enhanced. It is the case that many liberal nation-states do not consistently 
display an active sense of citizenship, nor do they demonstrate moral responsibility or 
social solidarity at home or abroad. Furthermore, many liberal states do not politically 
engage the institutional processes of responsiveness and substantive democracy, and 
many states have media systems monopolized by a few large media companies or have 
media systems and civil societies supressed by governments. The contemporary 
predominance of neo-liberalism also heightens the concern that policymaking privileges 
private economic interests and stifles debate about public interests (Crouch 2004; 
Slaughter 2005). In essence, while the gap between contemporary practice and 
republicanism may arguably be narrower than for cosmopolitan democracy, there is 
considerable work required to instantiate the republican project. 
While there is general agreement in republican circles that the state alone is not enough to 
instantiate republicanism in the contemporary global circumstance, there is far less consensus 
about the precise nature and breadth of global responsibility or how such responsibility could be 
developed consistent with republican purposes. These disagreements are best illustrated in the 
arguments of Barbara Buckinx, James Bohman and Phillip Pettit. Buckinx’s position is the one 
that hews most closely to seeing non-domination only being possibly developed by public actors, 
with IGOs such as the United Nations being the closest global proxy for the public nature of the 
state (Buckinx 2012). In this account, the constructive role of transnational civil society actors is 
doubtful and limited. James Bohman’s position concurs with the general republican support for 
international cooperation, but advances the argument that non-domination requires citizens to 
have an active capacity to ‘create and modify their own obligations and duties’ rather than them 
being derived from the responsibilities of citizens to the republican state (Bohman 2008, 197; 
2007, 55). This entails the capacity for citizens to initiate global political deliberation, which 
requires that some aspects of citizenship be global in scope and a greater awareness of humanity 
as a form of ‘transnational political community’ (Bohman 2008, 192). This means in order to 
avoid domination a republic ‘must hold open the possibility that its current boundaries and 
membership, the scope of those whose political rights creates obligations, remains open’ 
(Bohman 2008, 208). In between these two positions is Pettit’s focus on augmenting the 
constitutional nature of the state with contestatory democracy, where citizens have the 
plebiscitary or editorial powers to contest governments by appealing to IGOs when state leaders 
fail their political responsibility to address domination (Pettit 2006, 16–20). This form of 
responsiveness could be enabled without any global form of political community. 
Despite some agreement with these positions, this chapter contends that there are concerns 
with these views in regards to republican political responsibilities and the possibilities they 
engender. With regards to Buckinx’s position, it could be argued that the operation of IGOs is 
hard to separate from transnational civil society in practice and that the deliberative contributions 
of citizens involved in civil society organizations could play an important role in identifying and 
addressing domination locally or globally. Furthermore, Bohman is open to the challenge that, 
while he uses republican language and supports republican goals, he does not support the 
republican approach that rests upon a conception of liberty that requires appropriately powered 
institutions of the state which direct democratically authorized interventions into society in order 
to prevent domination by actors in society. Furthermore, similarly to cosmopolitanism, it is also 
not clear where the publicly spirited citizens come from in Bohman’s conception of transnational 
republicanism. Despite this concern, there is no doubt that transnational reflection and action in 
regards to contemporary forms of domination is required—as Bohman contends. Lastly, with 
regards to Pettit’s account, contestatory democracy is an important way to support the republican 
ideal of globalized sovereignty and develop more responsive forms of global political 
responsibility, but there are questions as to how the constitutional nature of the republican state 
could be supported by citizens. In essence, there is a considerable gap between Pettit’s account of 
republicanism and the skills and dispositions needed by citizens to evaluate and consider 
transnational forms of domination and deliberation in order to make forms of political 
responsibility actually responsive and effective within the order of globalized sovereignty. 
Consequently, this chapter seeks to develop a position that focuses more overtly on the role 
required of the republican citizen to make the political responsibility of contestatory democracy 
effective. This ‘bottom-up’ position contends that republican citizens must play a dual role of 
deepening the public control of their state while also engaging with global governance. This 
argument follows from a more adaptive interpretation of republican theory, termed ‘critical 
republicanism’ by Cécile Laborde (2010, 50) which borrows from critical theory ‘an interest in 
social critique and in social change’, which starts from ‘existing institutions and relationships, 
identifies their dominating and oppressive features, and advocates their transformation’. This 
position also contends that with respect to transnational forms of domination and democracy the 
republican impulse is that ‘domestic and international reform must go hand in hand’ (Laborde 
2010, 64). This position rests on the claim that Pettit’s conception of neo-roman republicanism 
needs to be more radical in order to effectively challenge contemporary forms of domination 
(Bellamy 2002; Laborde 2008, 2010). It also contends that republicanism needs to be more 
adaptive about how republican responsibilities and practices are developed by taking the view 
that, while a lived sense of political community is a foundation of political responsibilities, these 
have changed in the past and will need to adapt to globalization (see Linklater 1998a, 1998b). 
In essence, this position is not in opposition to Pettit’s interpretation of the republican legacy 
regarding the importance of non-domination and the institutions required to realize this condition. 
Rather, the claim here is that the gap between contemporary social arrangements and the 
republican conception of institutions and citizenship required is far greater than suggested in this 
account of republicanism. Furthermore, while citizenship, civic virtue, and a republican state are 
essential preconditions for empowering political responsibilities, republican conceptions of 
citizenship do need to be adaptable and dynamic in order to respond to the contemporary context 
of globalization. The political responsibility that the state has for its citizens—and the 
responsibility a citizen has for their state—can lead to responsive forms of global responsibility 
without a global political community, as outlined in the previous section. However, to do so 
citizens will need to have the dispositions and skills to enhance the capacity of republican states 
to identify and address various forms of domination through the activity of the state. The ideals 
and practices of citizenship cannot remain static. The position of critical republicanism seeks to 
augment the practices of citizenship for more effective political responsibility in three principle 
ways. 
The first and most fundamental way is to pragmatically augment the virtues that inform 
republican citizenship. The desire to extend political responsibility and responsive governance 
beyond the state is at one level a logical extension of the republican conception of active 
citizenship to a context of transnational sources of domination and governance, but on another 
level this requires adapting the republican conception of citizenship in light of contemporary 
forms of domination that originate beyond the state. The republican conception of patriotism and 
citizenship extol public virtues regarding involvement in political life and a willingness to 
contribute to the public good and liberty in a particular state. Such admiration of political 
involvement is not a selfless attitude because citizens act in such a fashion to prevent their own 
domination by working with others to ensure their common liberty by developing an 
appropriately empowered state. However, the position that stems from critical republicanism is 
that these virtues need to adapt to contemporary types of politics and domination. Critical 
republicanism can been seen to build upon Cicero’s archetypal formulation of ‘prudence, justice, 
courage and temperance’ as virtues required by citizens (Skinner 1984, 214). These virtues are 
still highly relevant to the long-term view required to address transnational forms of domination. 
However, there are other practical virtues we need to add to these in the context of contemporary 
globalization (see Slaughter 2014). Firstly, we need to expand on the virtue of justice and see 
cosmopolitanism as a personal virtue that informs the ways that citizens conceive of politics and 
direct the state. That is, to see being engaged with global issues and the reciprocal concern for all 
human beings as being necessary to realize liberty in a highly interdependent world (see Turner 
2002). The second extends on the notion of prudence to incorporate reflective deliberation about 
political discourse and policies (see Dryzek 2006). In a world of rapid ecological changes and 
uncertain knowledge, there is the requirement in respect to many global challenges that scientific 
and expert knowledge is constantly in flux. Being reflective means willing to listen to expert 
advice and being willing to update the policies citizens are willing to justify in order to promote 
liberty at home and abroad. 
The second way to develop responsive governance beyond the state is to rethink what 
contestation means within contestatory democracy to ensure that there are opportunities for 
deliberation between republican citizens and IGOs. While Pettit’s account of contestatory 
democracy is certainly crucial, there are questions of how contestatory democracy will operate 
with respect to IGOs that have memberships of over 190 states. Can citizens of any one state have 
a meaningful impact on an IGO in this context? Will such contestations in one state undermine 
the functional purpose of such IGOs and be limited to a reactive role to past decisions but not be 
able to influence the ongoing agenda? One option here that is congruent with the critical 
republican approach is to couple contestatory democratic mechanisms with transnational 
deliberative processes which accord with the critical theory underpinnings of deliberative 
democracy (Dryzek 2006, 2011). There have been arguments for deliberative impulses in specific 
forms of global governance, including developing principles that inform international financial 
governance (Germain 2010), the WTO (Higgott and Erman 2010), and the G20 (Slaughter 2013). 
In these cases these forums of global governance could act as, what Randall Germain (2010, 501) 
terms, an ‘institutional anchor’ that creates public spheres constituted by deliberation between 
officials of global governance and citizens. In these cases the practical advantage of this approach 
is that this contestation could be of the discourses and deliberations at play rather than attempting 
to include all of humanity into these decision-making processes, and thus can be seen to be more 
proactive and able to influence the agenda of these IGOs. 
The third way to make governance more responsive is for republican citizens to have critical 
respect for transnational activism and the resulting deliberations in transnational civil society. 
Transnational activism involves a range of positions and actors who are not necessarily intent on 
reducing domination in specific transnational contexts. The ideological diversity of transnational 
activism is especially manifest with an array of progressive, conservative, and corporate positions 
(Anheier et al. 2001, 7–10; Dryzek 2006), and questions regarding how steadfastly deliberations 
of activists can promote non-domination. Nevertheless, republican citizens could use such 
activity to identify the domination of people around the world by observing the interaction and 
information provided by these diverse groups and providing inputs into the operation of IGOs 
(Scholte 2011). Aside from indicating that citizens are concerned with domination and operate 
within a context where republican virtues are lived out in political life (Laborde 2010, 51), the 
approach of critical republicanism emphasizes that citizens are both participants and adjudicators 
of transnational activism. The idea of critical respect of transnational activism is a sense that 
republican citizens can respect people who play a role in domestic and transnational activism and 
be willing to critically engage with these people’s views, but the ultimate prism of republican life 
is to bring these transnational discussions into republican deliberations about the public good and 
questions of domination. The view here, which is also present in critical accounts of deliberative 
democracy, is that it is best to have these various views represented and discussed publicly 
(Dryzek 2006; Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008). There are signs that this approach could be feasible. 
Recent developments in the operation of many IGOs demonstrate more openness to civil society 
(Scholte 2011). 
The republican argument mounted here seeks to augment the capacity of citizens to develop 
more effective domestic and international means to address domination. There is a sense that, 
instead of citizens directing the state to be a ‘local agent of a world common good’ (Hedley Bull 
cited in Shapcott 2013, 140), republicanism seeks to ensure that the state can be a more 
responsible international agent of a locally derived public good. However, the recognition in the 
critical account of republicanism developed here is that deliberations about any ‘local’ public 
good need to take on cosmopolitan and reflective dimensions in an era of globalization. It is 
important to highlight that the dispositions and deliberations aiming at developing non-
domination must necessarily embrace the relationship between the active citizen and the power of 
the state. Such citizens would permit the state to develop responsive international institutions as 
well as ensure that the state is restrained domestically and internationally with regards to how a 
republican state deals with those people outside the state, as contended by republicans and 
cosmopolitans alike (see Pettit 2014; Shapcott 2013). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that republican theory offers important insights regarding 
the development of political responsibility and responsiveness beyond the state in a world 
characterized by global forms of domination, deliberation, and governance. 
Fundamentally, republican scholarship contends that while the development of a globally 
responsive world government is improbable, we can extend political responsibility and 
responsive governance beyond the state without developing a global political community 
or a cosmopolitan form of democracy. In this account, responsibilities beyond the state 
are important but fundamentally depend upon citizens feeling responsible for their state 
and creating responsive states. While the republican state looms large as the locus of 
publicly directed power able to constitute non-domination, it is the role of politically 
engaged citizens willing to contest authority which is crucial to developing global forms 
of moral and political responsibility. However, this chapter considers that there is a 
significant gap between republican theory and the democratic practice of liberal nation-
states. The contribution of this chapter to this republican literature and the literature of 
political responsibility rests on attempting to advance a critical conception of 
republicanism which recognizes the existence of this gap and thereby focuses attention on 
the political dispositions that republican citizens need to place restraints on the state and 
develop responsive international institutions. Given the presence of global forms of 
domination and governance, this responsibility is not altruism on the part of republican 
citizens but a necessary part of attempting to prevent and reduce domination in a 
globalizing world. 
REFERENCES 
Anheier, H. Marlies G. and Kaldor, M. (2001) ‘Introducing Global Civil Society’, in Global 
Civil Society 2001, edited by Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 3–22. 
Barnett, M. (2006) ‘Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War’, International 
Security 30 (4): 87–112. 
Beardsworth, R.J. (2015) ‘From Moral to Political Responsibility in a Globalized Age’. Ethics 
and International Affairs 29 (1): 71–92. 
Bellamy, R. (2002) ‘Being Liberal with Republicanism’s Radical Heritage: A Comment on 
Pettit’. Res Publica 8 (3): 269–74. 
Bohman, J. (2007) Democracy Across Borders. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Bohman, J. (2008) ‘Transnational Democracy and Nondomination’ in Republicanism and 
Political Theory, edited by Cécile Laborde and J. Maynor. London: Basil Blackwell, 190–
217. 
Brown. G.W. (2011) ‘Bringing the State Back into Cosmopolitanism: The Idea of Responsible 
Cosmopolitan States’, Political Studies Review, 9 (1): 53–66. 
Buckinx, B. (2012) ‘Global actors and public power’, Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy, 15 (5): 535–51. 
Crouch, C. (2004) Post-Democracy. Cambridge: Polity. 
Dagger, R. (2006) ‘Neo-republicanism and the Civic Economy’, Politics, Philosophy and 
Economics, 5 (2): 151–73. 
Dryzek, J. (2006) Deliberative Global Politics: Discourse and Democracy in a Divided 
World. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Dryzek, J. (2011) ‘Global Democratization: Soup, Society, or System?’ Ethics & International 
Affairs, 25 (2): 211–34. 
Dryzek, J. (2012) ‘Global Civil Society: The Progress of Post-Westphalian Politics’, Annual 
Review of Political Science, 15: 101–19. 
Dryzek, J. and Niemeyer, S. (2008) ‘Discursive Representation’, American Political Science 
Review, 102 (4): 481–93. 
Erskine, T. (2008) ‘Locating Responsibility: the Problem of Moral Agency in International 
Relations’ in C. Reus–Smit and D. Snidal (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 699–707. 
Germain, R. (2010) ‘Financial governance and transnational deliberative democracy’. Review of 
International Studies 36 (2): 493–509. 
Hale, T. and Held, D. (2011) Handbook of Transnational Governance Innovation. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Held, D. (1995) Democracy and the Global Order. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Higgott, R. and Erman, E. (2010) Deliberative global governance and the question of 
legitimacy: what can we learn from the WTO? Review of International Studies 36 (2): 449–
70. 
Laborde, C. (2008) Critical Republicanism. The Hijab Controversy and Political 
Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Laborde, C. (2010) ‘Republicanism and Global Justice: a Sketch’, European Journal of 
Political Theory, 9 (1) January: 48–69. 
Linklater, A. (1998a) ‘Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian European State’, in 
Daniele Archibugi et al (eds), Re-Imagining Political Community. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
113–37. 
Linklater, A. (1998b) The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations 
of the Post-Westphalian Era. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Miller, D. (1999) ‘Bounded Citizenship’, in K. Hutchings and R. Dannreuther (eds) 
Cosmopolitan Citizenship. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Patomäki, H. (2003) ‘Problems of Democratizing Global Governance: Time, Space and the 
Emancipatory Process’, European Journal of International Relations 9 (3): 347–76. 
Pettit, P. (1999a) Republicanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pettit, P. (1999b) ‘Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization’, in Democracy’s 
Values, edited by Ian Shapiro and Casino Hacker-Cordón. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 163–90. 
Pettit, P. (2006) ‘Democracy, National and International’, Monist, 89, 2, 302–25. 
Pettit, P. (2010) ‘Republican Law of Peoples’, European Journal of Political Theory, 9 (1): 70–
94. 
Pettit, P. (2014) Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World. New York: W. 
W. Norton & Company. 
Scholte J.A. (ed.) (2011) Building Global Democracy? Civil Society and Accountable 
Global Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Shapcott, R. (2013) ‘From the good international citizen to the cosmopolitan political 
community: A constitutional path’ International Politics, 50 (1): 138–57. 
Skinner, Q. (1984), ‘The Idea of Negative Liberty: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives’, 
in Philosophy in History, edited by Richard Rorty, Jerome B. Schneewind and Quentin 
Skinner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 193–224. 
Skinner, Q. (1998) Liberty Before Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Slaughter, A. (2004) A New World Order: Government Networks and the 
Disaggregated State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Slaughter, A. and Hale, T. (2005) ‘A Covenant to Make Global Governance Work’, 
Open Democracy 21 December <http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-
vision_reflections/covenant_3141.jsp> (Accessed 20/5/2015). 
Slaughter, S. (2005) Liberty Beyond Neo-liberalism: A Republican Critique of Liberal 
Governance in a Globalising Age. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Slaughter, S. (2013) The prospects of deliberative global governance in the G20: legitimacy, 
accountability, and public contestation. Review of International Studies 39 (1): 71–90. 
Slaughter, S. (2014) ‘Transnational Democratisation and Republican Citizenship: Towards 
Critical Republicanism’ Global Constitutionalism 3 (3) September: 310–37. 
Turner, B. (2002) ‘Cosmopolitan Virtue, Globalization and Patriotism’ Theory Culture Society 
19: 45–63. 
Viroli, M. (1995) For Love of Country. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Walzer, M. (1994) Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame: Notre 
Dame Press. 
Young, I. (2011) Responsibility for justice. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press. 
